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is insurPr ngainst 
nets o!' animal Lo one who IYithont f~ult, and question 
dng·. 
i m ma tr· rial. 
action for personal in-
<'ntitlcd to instructions in 
rnle th::t kerpcr of dog, which lw knows to 
, i~ under absolute duty to restrain 
[ ± j Id."·--Dog:f!-Actions-Instructions.-Jnstructions to jury that 
if ddt·wlants' h:1it to do act dangerous to person 
or lml'w of rmch propensity they 
were 1wcler to r.·r<tr:1iu or conAr:e it arc insufficient where 
,1o Hot tell jtll')' that ;;m,]\ was nb:olute, und where, 
wlwn Yi•·1n>rl in their eontrxt ll"itlJ o!:hrT )ustrnctions, they 
in rejPding· plain-
which he knows 
, .• <PH.l,:r :1hsolnte tluty to 
jury thnt such b'!'JlCr is only 
f'RF~ to restrain dog, such 
m li,~ht of mH·ontrndictcd 
c\·idell(:<' nwl im;trnetious t!.at wcne jnry rlid not believe 
that h:1<l :111P;:·r·d dnwcProus or th:1i r]pfendants 
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Action for for 
,Judgment for defendants affirmed . 
• Tames C. Pnrerll and .:Uicharl Hiorctan for 
Bronson, Bronson & J\IrKinnon and John F. \Yard foe 
Hespondents. 
'l1HAY~OH, J.~Plaintiti' {·ntered 
on a jury verdict m an action for Plain-
t iff's and evidence 1vas introduced to 
illat as she a 
public side1valk defendants' police upon and 
]mocked ller dcrwn causing severe that the clog had 
a propensity to jmnp on people, that <1efendants knew of 
this propensity, and that, notwithstanding this knowledge. 
defendants allowed the to roam at restraint. 
The defendauts' eYidence showed that the 
dog with no propensity to jump on people and it had 
merely aceidentally bnmped into plaintiff \vhile with 
another dog. 
Plaintiff does not question the sufficiency of the evidenct' 
to support the judgment. Her sole contention is that the 
court erroneously failed to instruct the jury in accordaJlC(' 
with the applicable rule of law. 
There is no dispute as to that rule. [1] '"rhe keeper of 
au animal of a species dangerous by nature, or of any animal 
which he knows, or has reason to lmmv, to have dangerous 
propensities, is liable, without wrongful intent or negligence:~ 
for (1amage to others resulting from such a propensity." 
(Prosser, Torts, p. 432; Gooding v. Chutes 155 Cal. 620, 
624 [102 P. 819, 18 Ann. Cas. 671, 28 L.H.A.N.S. 1071] ; 
Clowdis v. F'resno Flume etc. Co., 118 CaL 320 [50 P. 
373, 62 Am.St.Rep. 238] ; Heath v. li'ruzia, 50 Cal.App.2d 
598, 600 r123 P.2d 560]; OpeZt v. Al. G. Barnes Co., 41 Cal. 
App. 776, 779 [183 P. 241]; see 3 C .• T.S., "Animals," 
~ 148; cf. Civ. §§ 3341, 3342.) [2] The liability of 
the keeper is absolute, for " [ t] he gist of the action is not 
the manner of keeping the vicious animal, but the keeping 
him at an with knowlrdge of the vicimlS propensities. [Cita-
tion.] In such instances the owner is an insurer against 
the aets of the animal, to one who is injured IYithout fault, 
and the question of the O\Yner 's negligence is not in the case. 
[Citations.]" (Opelt v . ..ttl. G. Barnes Co., supm, 41 CaL 
App. 776, 779.) 
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hovvevcr, 
an absolute duty, 
;vith other instructions2 
It h; clearly apparent 
of certain of plaintiff's proposed 
modification of certain of her proposed in-
its \1-ithdrawaP of one of her proposed 
it to the , that the court under-
care and so instructed 
the court erred in rejecting plaintiff's pro-
im;trnctions that the keeper of a dog, which he knows 
kwe a propensity, is under ar1 absolute duty 
ram aml in instructing the jury that such a 
JS UIJCler a to exercise ordinary care to 
restraill the we do not believe that the error was preju-
11
' If the keeper of a dog knows that the dog was aec.ustomecl to jump 
l!l1 h nm::n the 's iH not affceted Ly the high 
neighbors. 
''Tbe, upon a human Leing is 
not mZJtcriaL 
( 'Tf knows .it to have 
it or eonilne it 
of another. 
propensities, he is 
may not exercise its 
keeper of a dog to inform himself or herself 
disposition of said dog.'' 
2 Tbey were immediately followed by an instruction that ''A keeper 
must use that degree of care to restrain it that an ordinarily 
person would have usod in the same or similar circumstances.'' 
>vas nlso instruch'd that "under the law of this state every 
bound, witJ,ont contract. to abstain from injuring the person 
of a,nother or from infTinging upon any of his rights, and 
everyone is Tesponsihle for injury occasioned to another fo1· his want 
care or skill in the management of his property or person. 
was not an insurer of the safety of the plaintiff or 
tl.e (Pin inti ff 's Ill'oposed instruction No. 31, as moilified by tho 
r~ourt 's alldition of the last sentence.) 
3 Por example, plnintiff 's proposed instruction number 2: "The keeper 
of nny dog which he knows or has reason to know to have dangerous 
propensities is liable without wrongful intent or negligenee :for damages 
to othns proximately resulting from sneh a propensity.'' 
'See, for the modification of plaintiff's proposed instruction 
number Hl, note 2, supra. 
5 Plaintiff 's proposed instruction number 2, quoted in note 3, supra. 
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dicial. 'l'lle not be 
invoked unless the tl1at had 
the alleged but that defendants knew 
or should have known that it had. In the 
tradicted evidence and the instrudions that were 
is clear that the jury did not believe that 
alleged or 
should haye lmmn1 that it had. 
evidence in this case on th(; issue of restraint the error would 
baYe been prejudicial. The uncontradided eyidence affirma-
tively shows, hmvever, that defendants did whatevPr 
to restrain the and allmved it to roam at will. Had the 
jury believed that the had the alleged pro-
pensity and that defendants knew it or should have known it, 
they were compelled the instructions to return a 
verdict for plaintiff, for a showing of a complete lack of any 
care to restrain the dog would show a violation of a duty to 
use reasonable care to restrain it. It follo·ws that the jury 
must have found that the did not have th:~ danger-
ous propensity, or that defendants did not know or were not 
charged with notiee of such propensity, and that a eontrary 
result would not have been reached even if all the 
instructions had been given. 
The judgment is afiirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and 
concurred. 
CAR'l'ER, ,T.-I dissent. 
.J., 
I had heretofore thought that at least one rnlc of law 
remained firmly fixed in the jurisprudence of thi:s state : that 
a party litigant was, at the very least, entitled to have the 
jury correctly instructed as to the law as it related to his 
particular la-vvsuit. The majority opinion frankly admits that 
there is no dispute as to what the applicable rule of law is; 
that plaintiff was entitled to instructions in conformity with 
the rule; that the jury was clearly misinformed by the court 
as to that rule of law. 
The evidence was sharply conflicting as to >Yhether the dog 
had dangerous propensities. If the dog did have dangerous 
propensities, defendant was under an absolute duty to restrain 
it. The matter is just as simple as that, but the jury was 
not so instructed. It was instructed that defendant must 
only exercise ordinary care. 
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was that the l1ad propen-
which were known to defendant. She was entitled to 
the that theory : 
P. 804] ; Ritckey v. 
'W aniorek v. United Rail-
Klamath etc. Oo. v. 
P. 159); Oassi-
722 P. 748} ; Buckley v. 
209 [89 P.2d 453) ; Lewis 
ua"··LLU'tJ."-'U 455 [112 P.2d 747]; 
386 [223 
& Oounty of 
; Perin v. Nelson 
; Rideau v. Los 
124 Cal.App.2d 466 P.2d 772] ; 
Bills v. Los Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 640 [255 
795] ; Petersen v. Riesckel, 115 Cal.App.2d 758 [252 
P.2d 986]; Bummers v. Randall, 123 Cal.App.2d 113 [266 
P.2d v. 124 Cal.App.2d 861 [269 P.2d 
626]. 
A law as it is given to it in 
the by the court. The rule is set forth 
in 24 California section 96, page 822, as fol-
lows : ''As a general rule instructions excluding issues or 
cteJtenses which are by are prejudicially 
erroneous.'' If the jury is not instructed 
as to the law applicable to ease it must, in effect, 
find for the defendant. Under the how can 
that instructions giving only defendant's theory of 
not plaintiff? The majority indulges 
Luocvi\J'll in order to decide just what the jury thought 
its The trial court was of the opinion 
care was all that was required defendant 
was so instructed. The theory of plaintiff's ease 
to the of the jury and, as a 
denied her in court. 
JUllginei1t should be reversed. 
petition a was denied June 23, 
was of the opinion that petition should 
